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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of Utah has jurisdiction to review 
these matters pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §35-1-86. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Both issues presented to the Court are subject to 
limited review "and the judgment of the trier will not be 
disturbed if based on substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence," Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, 585 
(Utah App. 1988). The Court should show maximum deference to the 
basic facts determined by the Industrial Commission and sustain 
its judgment "if there is evidence of any substance that can be 
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made." 
Wilburnr 748 P.2d at 586. 
PPTERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
1. U.C.A. S35-1-90. 
"No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
compensation under this title shall be valid." 
2. Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-16. 
Settlement Agreements. 
"A. Section 35-1-90, U.C.A., invalidates any agreement 
which requires an employee to waive his rights. Settlement 
agreements are appropriate, however, when the parties, in good 
faith, view the claim as one of the doubtful compensability." 
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,fB. In determining if a claim is of doubtful 
compensability, the commission will look to the facts of the 
matter and will not be bound by mere recitations in the 
settlement agreement." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The employer, Franklin Stoddard, asked Greg Biddle 
to come to work for him in September, 1989. (Record, p. 144, 
lines 2-6). 
2. Mr. Stoddard acknowledges that Biddle did work for 
him drilling water wells. (Record, p. 156, lines 17-20). 
3. Mr. Biddle worked an average of forty hours per 
week for Mr. Stoddard and was available to Mr. Stoddard anytime 
during regular business hours. (Record, p. 145, line 17 through 
p. 146, line 16). 
4. Mr. Biddle never refused work offered him by his 
employer, Mr. Stoddard. (p. 145, line 17 through p. 146, line 
16). 
5. Mr. Stoddard acknowledges that Mr. Biddle normally 
rode with him to work; when Mr. Biddle reported to Stoddard's 
house for work, Mr. Stoddard drove Biddle to the work site. (p. 
165, line 17 through p. 166, line 14). 
6. On the date of Mr. Biddle's accident, June 4, 1990, 
Mr. Stoddard drove Biddle to work. (p. 157, lines 7-25). 
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7. Mr. Stoddard stopped with Biddle to help Stoddard's 
cousin set up a drilling rig — the type of work Mr. Stoddard 
hired Biddle to do. (p. 156, 1. 17-20; p. 157, 1.-7-25). 
8. Mr. Stoddard estimates it takes one to two hours to 
set up a drilling rig. (p. 158, 1. 4-7). 
9. Despite the time required to set up his cousin's 
drilling rig, Mr. Stoddard never told Biddle to stay off the work 
site. (p. 168, 1. 6-7). 
10. Mr. Stoddard did not tell Biddle not to do the 
work setting up the drilling rig for Stoddard's cousin, (p. 168, 
lines 8-11). 
11. Mr. Stoddard never told Biddle he was not working 
for him at the time of the accident. (p. 147, 1. 16-25). 
12. Mr. Biddle was unaware of any dispute regarding 
the compensability of his claim or Mr. Stoddard's Workers' 
compensation liability, (p. 148, 1. 23 through p. 149). 
13. Nearly two years ago, at the February 3, 1993 
hearing before Judge Elicerio of the Industrial Commission, Mr. 
Stoddard's attorney stated why the uninsured Mr. Stoddard was 
unable to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Biddle: "My 
client really had no money at that time to pay Mr. Biddle 
anything...." (p. 132, lines 16-17). 
14. In its Order and subsequent denials of Mr. 
Stoddard's two Motions for Review, the Industrial Commission 
invalidated the stipulation, finding there was no good-faith 
dispute on the compensability of Biddle's claim; the Commission 
3 
also found Biddle within the course of his employment with 
Stoddard at the time of his injury. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. U.C.A. §35-1-90 and Industrial Commission Rule 
R568-1-16 provide that, unless the parties in good faith view a 
claim as one of doubtful compensability, no agreement waiving an 
employee's rights to workers' compensation shall be valid. Mr. 
Biddle never viewed his claim as doubtful, but always intended to 
obtain his full benefits. Mr. Stoddard never viewed the claim, 
in good faith, as doubtful — he entered the stipulation simply 
because he was unable to meet his workers' compensation 
obligation to Mr. Biddle. The Industrial Commission was correct 
in ruling the stipulation invalid and unenforceable. 
2. When injured, Mr. Biddle was within the course of 
his employment with Mr. Stoddard. He was rendering the service 
he was hired by Mr. Stoddard to perform. Mr. Stoddard never told 
Mr. Biddle to stop, but was working with him at the time of 
injury. Stoddard had driven Biddle to the work site. Mr. Biddle 
had the impression he was expected to assist Mr. Stoddard as part 
of his employment and was given no indication to the contrary. 
Mr. Biddle's injuries are compensable. 
3. The Court should give maximum deference to the 
Industrial Commission's findings and not disturb its ruling, 
which was based on substantial evidence. 
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4. Mr. Biddle is entitled to additional workers' 
compensation benefits from Mr. Stoddard as set forth in the Order 
of the Industrial Commission, which the Court should affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED CORRECTLY THAT THE 
STIPULATION IS INVALID AND UNENFORCEABLE ON SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE THAT BIDDLE DID NOT VIEW HIS CLAIM TO BE OF 
DOUBTFUL COMPENSABILITY. 
Mr. Stoddard cites to Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 
748 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1988), as dispositive on the validity of 
his stipulation with Biddle. In Wilburn, this Court held: 
[I]f the contract is ambiguous and the trial 
forum finds facts respecting the intention of 
the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the 
appellate review is strictly limited and the 
findings and judgment of the trier will not 
be disturbed if based on substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence. 
Wilburn. 748 P.2d at 585 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
In accordance with Wilbyirn and Industrial Commission 
Rule R568-1-16, the Administrative Law Judge received extrinsic 
evidence at the February 3, 1993 hearing on the intention of the 
parties. Substantial, competent evidence was admitted showing 
that Mr. Biddle did not intend to waive his rights to further 
benefits or the payment of additional medical expenses. Mr. 
Biddle never viewed his claim as one of doubtful compensability. 
(Record, p. 148, line 23 through p. 149). He entered the 
stipulation because Mr. Stoddard had no workers' compensation 
insurance and had told Biddle he was unable to pay the claim. 
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Looking to the facts, as directed by Industrial Commission Rule 
R568-1-16(B), the ALJ concluded that Mr. Biddle's claim was not 
of doubtful compensability, because Mr. Biddle believed he had a 
valid claim and was entitled to additional benefits in district 
court. 
As Mr. Stoddard points out, the test for determining 
the enforceability of the stipulation is a subjective one: WHAT 
DID MR. BIDDLE BELIEVE? 
[T]he issue was not so much whether the judge 
believed the applicant sustained a 
compensable accident as it was a matter of 
what the parties believed and acted upon.... 
Wilburn, 748 P.2d at 586 (emphasis added.) The record shows 
that Mr. Biddle always believed he had a valid, compensable 
claim. He entered the stipulation with the understanding that he 
could obtain additional workers' compensation in district court. 
Pursuant to U.C.A. §35-1-90 and Rule R568-1-16, the ALJ ruled the 
stipulation unenforceable, and the Industrial Commission twice 
affirmed the ruling on review. 
In WilburnP this court deferred to the Industrial 
Commission: 
[W]e give maximum deference to the basic 
facts determined by the agency, which will be 
sustained if there is evidence of any 
substance that can be reasonably regarded as 
supporting the determination made. Wilson 
v. Industrial Comm'n,. 735 P.2d 403, 405 
(Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah 
1987). 
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Wilburn. supra (emphasis added). Substantial evidence supports 
the Industrial Commission's ruling that the stipulation is not 
enforceable. (Record, pages 132, 148, 149, among others). The 
stipulation, by which Stoddard seeks to shield himself from his 
obligations, is invalid: "No agreement by an employee to waive 
his rights to compensation under this title shall be valid." 
U.C.A. §35-1-90. The parties — and Mr. Biddle in particular — 
did not view Mr. Biddle's claim to be of doubtful compensability. 
Statement of Facts, paras. 12 and 13. The Court should affirm 
the Order of the Industrial Commission. 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION RULED CORRECTLY THAT, WHEN 
INJURED, BIDDLE WAS WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT WITH 
STODDARD. 
At the time of his injury, Mr. Biddle was within the 
course of his employment with Mr. Stoddard. In accordance with 
Wilburnf 748 P.2d at 586, the Court should give maximum deference 
to the facts determined by the Industrial Commission, which 
include: 
Finally, the ALJ finds that the applicant 
felt he was working his regular job on June 
4, 1990 and was never told anything to the 
contrary. He was not told to remain in the 
truck and Stoddard allowed him to assist with 
the work on June 4, 1990. Therefore, any 
argument that the appliance was acting as a 
volunteer on June 4, 1990 and was not in the 
course of his employment is not supportable. 
Findings of Fact, March 8, 1993, page 6. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah, in M & K Corporation v. 
Industrial Comrn'n, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1948), held that an 
injury occurs in the course of employment if 
it occurs while the employee is rendering 
service to his employer which he was hired to 
do or doing something incidental thereto, at 
the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service. 
See alsof Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), p. 352; Restatement, Agency, 
Section 228. 
Mr. Stoddard hired Mr. Biddle to drill water wells. 
(Record, p. 156, lines 17-20). On the injury date, as he 
normally did, Stoddard drove Biddle to the drilling site. 
(Record, pages 156-57, 165-66). Biddle was injured during normal 
working hours while setting up a drilling rig, the type of work 
Stoddard hired him to do. (Record, pages 156-157). Mr. Stoddard 
was working with Biddle when he was injured and never instructed 
Biddle to refrain from working. (Record, page 168). Mr. Biddle 
intended to benefit Mr. Stoddard, his employer, by assisting with 
the drilling rig. Biddle was rendering the service to Stoddard 
which he was hired to do, or, at least, was doing something 
incidental to his employment. In either case, he satisfied the 
"course of employment" test of M & K Corporation. above. 
At the time of injury, Mr. Biddle was performing the 
type of work he normally performed while employed by Stoddard. 
Mr. Stoddard never told him to stop. Professor Larson, in 
Workmen's Compensation Law §27.41, 48 (1992) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added), states: 
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[W]hen any person in some authority directs 
an employee to run some private errand or do 
some work outside his normal duties for the 
private benefit of the employer or superior, 
an injury in the course of that work is 
compensable.•.• 
[T]he employer's "order" need not take the 
form of an outright command, if in the 
circumstances the employer's "suggestion" or 
even the employee's impression of what is 
expected of him in serving the interests of 
his employer or superior are in fact 
sufficient to motivate his undertaking the 
service in question. 
Under the circumstances, Mr. Biddle believed he was 
expected to assist in the erection of Mr. Stoddard's cousin's 
drilling rig. Mr. Stoddard drove Mr. Biddle to the site, 
explained why they were stopping, and never told Biddle not to 
assist. (Record, p. 168). It was Mr. Biddle's reasonable 
impression that he was expected to help. When injured while 
doing so, Mr. Biddle was within the course of his employment with 
Stoddard. 
CONCLUSION 
Under U.C.A. §35-1-90, Industrial Commission Rule R568-
1-16, and Utah case law, the parties' stipulation is invalid and 
unenforceable, because Biddle and Stoddard did not in good faith 
view the claim as one of doubtful compensability. Mr. Stoddard 
is liable to pay additional workers' compensation benefits, 
because Biddle was an employee of Stoddard within the course of 
his employment when injured. Nearly five years after his 
accident, Mr. Biddle is entitled to the workers' compensation 
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benefits set forth in the Order of the Industrial Commission, 
which the Court should affirm. 
DATED this I1& day of January, 1995. 
Scotjt F. f>qi 
Attorney for Respondent Biddle 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT GREGORY LYNN BIDDLE this <Z& 
day of January, 1995, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Roger F. Baron 
Attorney for Petitioner Stoddard 
45 North 100 East 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600 
Sharon Eblen 
Attorney for Uninsured Employers' Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6612 
Mr. Gregory Biddle 
265 North 300 West, #19 
Tremonton, UT 84337 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-90 
compensation to a minor employee, such sum shall be paid only to his legally 
appointed guardian. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, 8 89; C.L. 1917, 
} 3150; ItS. 1933 & C. 1943,42-1-83; L. 1945, 
ch. 65, § 1. 
Cross-References. — Right of action by 
parents for injury to child, 5 78-11-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
This section was enacted to enable a minor 
not under statutory prohibitions to enter into 
lawful contracts for the rendering of personal 
service and to assure him, and incidentally the 
employer, the same protection as an adult ren-
dering like service. Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet 
Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156 P.2d 885 
(1945). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
CJS. — 99 C. J.S. Workmen's Compensation 
} 122. 
35-1-90. Void agreements between employers and em-
ployees. 
No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this 
title shall be valid. No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the 
premium paid by his employer shall be valid. Any employer who deducts any 
portion of such premium from the wages or salary of any employee entitled to 
the benefits of this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more 
than $100 for each such offense. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 90; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3151; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-84. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Agreements to settle claims. 
Effect of agreements of settlement. 
Rights of commission. 
Constitutionality. 
This section, invalidating agreements by em-
ployees to waive rights under the act (§ 35-1-1 
et seq.), is not unconstitutional. Barber Asphalt 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371,135 
R2d 266 (1943). 
Agreements to settle claims. 
Agreements to settle claims after the injury 
probably would be invalid under this section. 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 
Utah 366, 274 P. 139 (1929); Barber Asphalt 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 135 P.2d 266 
(1943). 
There is nothing in this section that either 
expressly or impliedly restricts right of em-
ployer and employee to make settlements or 
imposes conditions thereupon. Accordingly, em-
ployer and employee's dependents may make 
settlement for employee's death after an award 
by commission since such settlement does not 
amount to a waiver within meaning of that 
term as used in this section. Brigham Young 
University v. Industrial Comm'n, 74 Utah 349, 
279 P. 889, 65 A.L.R. 152 (1929). 
This section was no bar to enforceability of a 
settlement agreement, where there was evi-
dence to support an administrative law judge's 
finding that the parties had a good faith dispute 
as to the compensability of the claim, notwith-
standing the Court of Appeals' determination 
that it "would have no difficulty" in finding the 
claim compensable. Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 
748 P.2d 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Effect of agreements of settlement. 
It is the intention of the Legislature to pre-
vent agreements of final settlement between 
employer, employee, and the insurance carrier 
261 
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suing a check payable to the worker and hiR attorney 
jointly constitutes a violation of this rule. 
R568-1-14. Acceptance/Denial of a Claim. 
A. Upon receiving a claim for benefits from an in-
jured employee, the carrier/self-msured employer 
shall promptly investigate the claim and begin pay-
ment of compensation within 21 days of a valid claim 
or the carrier shall send the claimant written notice, 
within 21 days, that further investigation is needed 
and the reasons for further investigation. Each car-
rier or self-insured employer shall complete its inves-
tigation within 45 days of teccipt of the claim and 
shall commence the payment of benefits or notify the 
claimant in writing that the claim is denied. 
B. The payment of compensation shall be consid-
ered overdue if not paid within 21 days of a valid 
claim or within the 45 days of investigation unless 
denied. 
C. Failure to make payment without good cause 
shall result in referral of insurance companies to the 
Insurance Department for appropriate disciplinary 
action and may be cause for revocation of the Certifi-
cate of Self-Insurance from self-insured employers. 
D. If a carrier or self-insurer begins payment of 
benefits on an investigation basis so as to process the 
claim in a timely fashion, the later denial of benefits 
based on newly discovered information shall be al-
lowed. 
R568-1-15. Compensation Agreements. 
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or em-
ployer may enter into a compensation agreement for 
the purpose of resolving a worker's compensation 
claim. Compensation agreements must be approved 
by the Commission. The compensation agreement 
must be that contained on Form 019 of the Industrial 
Commission forms and shall include the following in-
formation: 
1. Signatures of the parties involved; 
2. Form 122 * Employer's First Report of Injury; 
3. Form 123 - Physician's Initial Report; 
4. Doctor's report of impairment rating; 
5. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement. 
B. Failure to provide any of the above documenta-
tion and forms shall result in the return of the com-
pensation agreement to the carrier or self-insured 
employer without approval. 
R568-1-16. Settlement Agreements. 
A. Section 35-1-90, U.C.A., invalidates any agree-
ment which requires an employee to waive his rights. 
Settlement agreements are appropriate, however, 
when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one 
of doubtful compensability. 
B. In determining if a claim is of doubtful compen-
sability, the Commission will look to the facts of the 
matter and will not be bound by mere recitations in 
the settlement agreement. 
C. The Commission encourages the settlement of 
disputed claims on an amicable basis whenever possi-
ble. If the claim is not of doubtful compensability, the 
settlement agreement must be open-ended to the ex-
tent allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Parties will be bound by their agreement to pay and 
receive a given amount of compensation for a given 
injury. 
D. Settlement agreements involving claims of 
doubtful compensability shall be subject to approval 
by the Commission. 
, E. The agreement shall be final and not subject to 
further review upon the same facts merely because of 
subsequent dissatisfaction. 
F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use 
by parties desirous of settling claims of doubtful com-
pensability. 
R568-M7. Permanent Total Disability. 
A. The Commission is required under Section 
35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a finding of total disability 
as measured by the substance of the sequential deci-
sion-making process of the Social Security Adminis-
tration under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, as revised. The use of the term "substance of 
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to 
confer some latitude on the Commission in exercising 
a degree of discretion in making its findings relative 
to permanent total disability. The Commission does 
not interpret the code section to eliminate the re-
quirement that a finding by the Commission in per-
manent and total disability shall in all cases be tenta-
tive and not final until rehabilitation training and/or 
evaluation has been accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Adminis-
tration or its designee has made, or is in the process 
of making, a determination of disability under the 
foregoing process, the Commission may use this infor-
mation in lieu of instituting the process on its own 
behalf. 
C. In evaluating industrial claims in which the in-
jured worker has qualified for Social Security disabil-
ity benefits, the Commission will determine if a sig-
nificant cause of the disability is the claimant's in-
dustrial accident or some other unrelated cause or 
causes. 
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability the Commission shall rely upon and be 
guided by the rules of disability determination pub-
lished by the Social Security Administration Office of 
Disability publication SSA Pub No. 64-014, as 
amended. In short, the sequential decision making 
process referred to requires a series of questions and 
evaluations to be made in sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful 
activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe im-
pairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the 
listed impairments in Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No. 
64-014? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 
doing his or her previous work9 
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total dis-
ability, the applicant shall be referred to the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and re-
habilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of Re-
habilitation determines that the applicant is unable 
to do any other work because of his age, education, 
and previous work experience, and as a result of an 
industrial accident, there shall be a hearing to review 
the determination of the Utah State Office of Reha-
bilitation and any objections thereto, unless the par-
ties waive the right to a hearing. 
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the 
parties, the Commission shall issue an order finding 
or denying permanent total disability based upon the 
preponderance of the evidence and with due consider-
ation of the vocational factors in combination with 
the residual functional capacity as detailed in Appen-
dix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014. 
R568-1-18. Burial Expenses. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-81, U.C.A., as amended in 
1992, if death results from an industrial injury or 
occupational disease, burial expenses in ordinary 
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Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
February 3, 1993 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing 
was pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Scott F. Squire, Attorney. 
The defendant, W. Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well 
& Exploration Drilling, was represented by Roger F. 
Baron, Attorney. 
The Uninsured Employers Fund was represented by 
Thomas Sturdy, Attorney. 
This case involves a claim for temporary total compensation 
(TTC), additional medical expenses and permanent impairment 
benefits (PPI) related to a June 4, 1990 industrial injury. The 
present adjudication was initiated by an application for hearing 
filed by the applicant on July 14, 1992. However, the applicant 
did file an application for hearing regarding the same injury in 
October of 1990. At that time, the applicant was represented by 
Gregory Skabelund, Attorney. The prior application for hearing did 
not result in a hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to 
a settlement agreement approved by another ALJ in July of 1991. 
That agreement involved the payment of a specified sum of medical 
expenses in exchange for the applicant's agreement to have the 
action dismissed with prejudice. The more recent application for 
hearing claims additional medical expenses, as well as compensation 
ORDER 
RE: GREGORY L. BIDDLE 
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(TTC and PPI)• The defendant uninsured employer answered the more 
recent application for hearing indicating that the applicant was 
barred from claiming additional benefits associated with the June 
4, 1990 injury as he had waived his right to further benefits 
pursuant to the July 1991 agreement. The applicant argues that the 
prior agreement does not bar him from claiming additional benefits 
associated with the June 4, 1990 industrial injury. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 27 years old on the date of 
injury and who had no dependents then or at this time. The 
applicant indicates that he was hired by W. F. Stoddard around 
September of 1989 at a wage rate of $4.00 plus per hour. Per 
Stoddard, he became aware that the applicant was available for work 
through a man he referred to as Mr. Butler. Stoddard cannot recall 
if he spoke directly to the applicant regarding the terms of his 
hire, or merely told Butler what to tell the applicant. Per 
Exhibit A-l (a chronological listing of the total hours worked by 
the applicant for Stoddard) the applicant began working for 
Stoddard on September 20, 1989. Per Exhibit A-l, the applicant 
worked from then through December 8, 1989, 4 to 6 days per week, 
averaging around 35 to 40 hours per week. From December 8, 1989 
through February of 1990, the applicant did not work and then he 
began working for Stoddard again in March of 1990, 4 to 6 days per 
week, averaging around 35 to 40 hours per week until he was injured 
on June 4, 1990 (per Exhibit A-l). Taking an average of the hours 
worked per week overall, the average number of hours per week was 
38.91 hours. Stoddard testified that he does not ajgree that 
Exhibit A-l is an accurate listing of the hours that the applicant 
worked for Stoddard, because the hours listed includes travel time 
to and from the job. Stoddard claims that the wage rate was $4.00 
per hour and nothing more than that. 
The applicant stated that he was hired to work on drilling 
rigs run by Stoddard. Stoddard testified that his business 
involved drilling water wells for customers who used the wells for 
agricultural pursuits or domestic water use. The applicant stated 
that he was expected to work everyday and was available to do this, 
but that some days there was no work to do and thus he stayed home. 
Apparently, on most occasions, Stoddard actually drove the 
applicant to the site where the drilling was going on and then 
drove the applicant home again at the end of the work day. The 
applicant stated that Stoddard paid him sporadically when he 
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himself got paid by his clients/customers. In fact, Exhibit A-l 
shows that the applicant got infrequent payments of either $250.00 
or $200.00 from Stoddard, with occasional other payments of smaller 
odd amounts. 
On June 4, 1990, Stoddard was apparently on his way to a 
regular drilling site with the applicant in his vehicle. Per 
Stoddard, on the way, he stopped to assist his cousin on a well he 
was digging in or near Thatcher, Utah. Per Stoddard, he did not 
expect the applicant to assist him at this site, but he states he 
did not specifically tell the applicant NOT to assist hinr. The 
applicant did assist setting up a drill rig at this site and got 
his fingers crushed by a pipe doing so around 10:00 A.M. The only 
medical record that was presented at hearing was a June 8, 1992 
office note of a Dr. J. Malouf from Logan Utah. This note 
indicates that it was the applicant's left middle and ring fingers 
that were injured in the accident with pseudoarthritis and loss of 
mormal joint architecture in the fingers. The office note 
indicates that the applicant was unable to perform his normal line 
of work from June 4, 1990 through October 15, 1990 as a result of 
the injury. He found that the applicant had an 11% hand permanent 
impairment resulting from the June 4, 1990 industrial accident. 
Per the prior settlement agreement, the applicant incurred expenses 
related to the June 4, 1990 injury at the Western Surgery Center in 
Logan, Utah, Bear River Valley Hospital in Tremonton, Utah, Logan 
Regional Hospital in Logan, Utah, with Dr. Malouf and with Mountian 
West Physical Therapy. At the time of the hearing, the applicant 
indicated that there were still outstanding balances of $28.76 at 
Logan Radiology and $1,025.71 at Mountain West Physical Therapy. 
At the time of the hearing, the defendant uninsured employer 
argued that: 1) the applicants claim for additional benefits 
related to the June 4, 1990 accident was barred due to the prior 
agreement and 2) that even if that agreement did not bar a further 
claim, the defendant was not liable to pay any benefits to the 
applicant as the defendant was not an employer required to cover 
the applicant's job injuries because: A) the applicant was only a 
casual employee and thus no coverage was required and/or B) the 
employer is an agricultural employer per U.C.A. 35-1-42 (3)(a), 
because the employer's business involved digging wells for 
agricultural usage. 
With respect to the first argument, the ALJ informed the 
parties at hearing that any agreement that sought to limit the 
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applicant's entitlement to benefits had to be in compliance with 
the Commission rule R568-1-16 (i.e. the agreement must be one where 
the parties in good faith believe the claim involved to be one of 
doubtful compensability). The applicant testified that he agreed 
to enter into the July 1991 agreement only because the employer was 
uninsured and he felt he had no recourse because the employer 
indicated inability to pay the full claim. Also, the applicant 
testified that his prior attorney told him that they could pursue 
the employer in civil court for compensation. The applicant 
indicated that he was unaware that he could have gotten an award of 
compensation at the Commission. Finally, he stated that he felt 
the agreement was that the employer would pay all the medical 
expenses related to the industrial injury and that the $5,100.00 
stated in the agreement was the full amount of all the expenses and 
not a limit on what the employer was required to pay. The 
applicant did acknowledge that he knew that the employer was 
arguing at the time of the prior application for hearing that the 
employer owed him nothing on his claim. 
. With respect to the July 1991 agreement, the employer argues 
that the agreement clearly states that the action would be 
dismissed with prejudice based on the limited payment of $5,100.00 
in medical expenses. Because the prior application does indicate 
a claim for compensation in addition to medical expenses, the 
employer argues that the applicant was waiving this claim for 
compensation in agreeing to the with-prejudice dismissal. The 
employer points to the prior answer filed in response to the 
initial application for hearing. The employer argues that that 
answer (Exhibit D-l) clearly shows that the employer felt the claim 
was one of doubtful compensability, because the answer indicates 
that Stoddard was not an employer due to the casual employment and 
the agricultural exemptions. Stoddard testified that he understood 
that the prior agreement settled the applicant's claim in its 
entirety. Finally, the Uninsured Employers Fund argues that the 
applicant was not acting as Stoddard's employee when he was injured 
(because Stoddard was just helping out his cousin at the time) and 
thus this is an additional reason why the applicant's claim was of 
doubtful compensability. 
With respect to his solvency, Stoddard testified that the 
only real property that he owns is the property on which his shop 
is located in Honeyville, Utah. Stoddard testified that he owns 
this outright and the property is not mortgaged. He indicated that 
he also owns a couple of trucks outright and some business 
equipment. Stoddard did not indicate the value of the property, 
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the equipment or the trucks. Stoddard stated that his business is 
still operating and that it made $13,000.00 last year. However, he 
stated that he owes $800.00 per month in alimony, he has an income 
tax liability, and that he is still paying on the $3,000.00 loan 
that he took out to pay off the applicant's medical expenses. In 
addition, he stated he had the normal monthly expenses for rent, 
food and utilities. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant sustained a compensable industrial injury on 
June 4, 1990 and his claim is not barred by the prior settlement 
agreement or any provision in U.C.A. 35-1-42 or 35-1-43. With 
respect to the prior settlement agreement, the ALJ notes that the 
Commission rule (R568-1-16) requires that the ALJ is to consider 
all the facts surrounding the claim in determining whether it was 
one of doubtful compensability and is not to rely simply on the 
recitations in the agreement. In this case, the employer relies 
heavily on the recitation in the agreement with respect to the 
applicant's agreement to a with-prejudice dismissal. However, the 
ALJ finds that the employer may have understood what this meant, 
but the applicant did not. In fact, the applicant felt that he 
could still pursue compensation, but per his prior attorney's 
instructions, he felt he needed to do this in another forum. 
Therefore, the ALJ feels that the agreement's recitation regarding 
dismissal is not an indication that the applicant understood his 
claim to be one of disputed validity. 
The ALJ also finds that the applicant may have understood 
that the employer was arguing that he owed the applicant nothing, 
but did not agree that there was any arguable basis for this. The 
applicant clearly did not consider his employment to be "casual." 
The only evidence presented on the issue of when the applicant 
worked shows he worked 4 to 6 days per week continuously for months 
at a time doing work that was in the usual course of Stoddard's 
business. Therefore, there is no basis in fact for the employer's 
argument that the applicant came under the casual employee 
exemption found in U.C.A. 35-1-43(1)(b) and the ALJ is not 
impressed that the applicant could have believed there was any 
basis in fact for this argument. The applicant also clearly did 
not consider Stoddard to be an agricultural employer, simply 
because he dug some wells that were used for agricultural purposes. 
The ALJ finds that the plain meaning of "agricultural employer" as 
it is used in U.C.A. 35-1-42(3)(a) is an employer engaged in crop 
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production or possibly animal husbandry, but not an employer who is 
engaged in the business of digging wells. Therefore, once again, 
there is no basis in fact for the employer's argument that he was 
an exempt employer under the statute and for this reason the ALJ 
cannot believe that the applicant could have believed there was any 
basis in fact for this argument. 
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ feels that the there is no 
legitimate argument that the applicant's claim was one of disputed 
validity and there is no convincing evidence that the applicant 
understood his claim to be one of disputed validity. In addition, 
the agreement itself does not even recite that the applicant was 
waiving a claim for future benefits associated with the June 4, 
1990 industrial injury. The indication that the "action" could be 
dismissed with prejudice is unclear in reference as to what 
"action" was being dismissed. Finally, the ALJ finds that the 
applicant felt he was working his regular job on June 4, 1990 and 
was never told anything to the contrary. He was not told to remain 
in the truck and Stoddard allowed him to assist with the work on 
June 4, 1990. Therefore, any argument that the applicant was 
acting as a volunteer on June 4, 1990 and was not in the course of 
his employment is not supportable. The fact that the customer 
happened to be a relative of Stoddard does not cause the work to be 
outside Stoddard's normal course of business. Therefore, there is 
no doubtful compensability based on a course-of-employment 
argument. Because the ALJ finds that the applicant's claim was not 
one of questionnable compensability and because the ALJ is not 
convinced that the applicant understood the prior agreement to 
waive any right to a further claim for compensation related to the 
June 4, 1990 industrial accident, the ALJ finds the applicant is 
not barred from claiming additional benefits associated with that 
accident. 
As the ALJ has determined that the outside-the-course-of-
employment defense and the defenses with respect to exemption are 
not sustainable and as no other arguments have been raised with 
respect to the compensability of the applicant's June 4, 1990 
injury, the ALJ finds that injury to be compensable. As the 
applicant has not waived any right to benefits associated with that 
accident, he is due the remainder of his medical expenses, TTC and 
PPI (based on the only medical evidence submitted, Dr. Malouf's 
June 8, 1992 office note) . The remainder of the expenses for Logan 
Radiology ($28.76) and Mountain West Physical Therapy ($1,025.72) 
need to be paid. In addition, the applicant is due TTC for the 
19.143 weeks indicated in Dr. Malouf's office note (June 4, 1990 
ORDER 
RE: GREGORY L. BIDDLE 
PAGE 7 
through October 15, 1990) and PPI for 18.48 weeks based on the 11% 
hand impairment rated by Dr. Malouf (168 weeks for the hand based 
on U.C.A. 35-1-66 (A)(2)(a) x .11). The applicant's compensation 
rate is based on an average weekly wage of $155.60 ($4.00 per hour 
x 38.91 hours per week) and computes to $104.00/week ($155.60 x 
.667). This makes the TTC award tp be $1,990.87 ($104.00 x. 19.143 
weeks) and the PPI award to be $1,921.92 ($104.00 x. 18.48 weeks). 
Attorney fees are based on Commission rule R568-1-7 at 20% of the 
benefits awarded and amount to $782.56 ($1,990.87 + $1,921.92 = 
$3,912.79 x .20). 
Although the ALJ is no accountant, per Stoddard's testimony 
regarding his assets and liabilities, it appears that Stoddard is 
not in a position to be able to pay the applicant's claim, as his 
liabilities completely exhaust his income. It is unclear what the 
value of his real or business property is and thus the ALJ finds 
that he is unable to pay the applicant's claim, giving rise to the 
liability of the Uninsured Employers Fund per U.C.A. 35-1-107. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund, 
pay the applicant, Gregory Biddle, temporary total compensation at 
the rate of $104.00 per week, for 19.143 weeks, or a total of 
$1,990.87, for the period of medical instability associated with 
the June 4, 1990 industrial accident, from June 4, 1990 through 
October 15, 1990. That amount is accrued and due and payable in 
a lump sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and 
less attorney fees to be awarded below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund, pay 
the applicant, Gregory Biddle, permanent impairment benefits, at 
the rate of $104.00 per week, for 18.48 weeks, or a total of 
$1,921.92, for the 11% hand impairment sustained by the applicant 
as a result of the June 4, 1990 industrial accident. That amount 
is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest at 8% 
per annum per U.C.A. 35-1-78. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund pay 
the outstanding medical expenses incurred as the result of the June 
4, 1990 industrial accident; said expenses to be paid in accordance 
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund pay 
Scott F. Squire, attorney for the applicant, the sum of $782.56, 
plus 20% of the interest payable on the award, for services 
rendered in.this matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid 
award to the applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office 
of Scott F. Squire. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Uninsured Employers Fund shall 
retain full reimbursement rights against the uninsured employer, W. 
Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling, based on 
the payment ordered herein. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utatj, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
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IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 92000861 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The provisions of U.C.A. 
applicable in this case. 
Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are 
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to 
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the 
commission." U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953). 
The statutes further provide that: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any omission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953). 
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws 
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a)(1953), and to "consider 
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953). 
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted 
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88 
(1965) which provides: 
...The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
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ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
the Workmen,s Compensation Act. 
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and 
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the 
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision- This 
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate 
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or 
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers' 
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules. 
Id. 
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the 
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority 
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the 
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena. 
The respondents filed motions for review asking the commission 
to review the order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) with 
regard to the following: 
(1) Does the applicant's prior commission approved stipulation 
which agreed to the dismissal of an earlier application for a 
hearing bar this application for benefits? 
(2) Was the applicant within the course of his employment at 
the time of the injury? 
(3) Was there sufficient proof to establish liability for the 
uninsured fund? 
I. DOES THE APPLICANT'S PRIOR STIPULATION 
BAR THE APPLICANT'S CURRENT APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS? 
The applicant had an accident on June 4, 1990 in which two 
fingers on his left hand were crushed while he was helping to 
assemble a drilling rig. The applicant filed an application for a 
hearing on October 23, 1990, seeking payment of medical expenses, 
temporary total compensation and permanent total disability. On 
July 10, 1991 an order was issued by the commission adopting a 
stipulation and dismissing the applicant's claim with prejudice. 
The parties stipulated that: 
The parties in the above-entitled action, 
hereby stipulate that W. Franklin Stoddard dba 
Water Well and Exploration Drilling will pay 
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the medical expenses of the Applicant, Gregory 
Lynn Biddle, in a sum not to exceed $5,100. 
Following said payment, Applicant agrees that 
this action shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
An order appended to the stipulation provided that: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to the 
above stipulation, that W. Franklin Stoddard 
dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling pay all 
of Applicant's uninsured medical expenses 
incurred as a result of the industrial accident 
dated the 4th day of June, 1990 as outlined 
below up to $5,100: 
The order then listed six medical providers and the amounts to be 
paid. 
Neither the order nor stipulation states that the claim was 
one of disputed validity, although the stipulation does state that 
the application is to be dismissed with prejudice. 
Under Wilburn v. Interstate Electric. 748 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 
1988), the commission must examine the evidence of the intent of 
the parties at the time of the agreement to determine whether the 
parties viewed the claim as one of disputed validity. This 
requirement has been adopted by rule R568-1-16. 
The ALJ examined the evidence presented by the parties and 
found that the applicant's testimony showed that the applicant did 
not view the claim to be of doubtful compensability at the time he 
entered into the stipulation. The applicant testified that he 
agreed to the stipulation because the employer was uninsured and he 
felt he had no recourse because the employer had indicated that he 
was unable to pay the entire claim. The applicant also testified 
that his attorney represented that he could recover the unpaid 
compensation and disability benefits in an action in district 
court. Finally, the applicant stated that he believed that the 
agreement provided that the employer would pay all the medical 
expenses related to the industrial injury and that the total of 
those bills was $5,100.00. 
The testimony further showed, and the ALJ found that the 
employer believed that the settlement resolved the matter entirely. 
Based upon the above findings of fact, the ALJ concluded that the 
claim was not one of disputed validity, since the applicant 
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believed that he had a valid claim and could recover the balance of 
his award in district court. 
It further appears that the agreement contained a mistake of 
fact with regard to the payment necessary to pay all of the 
applicant's medical bills, and is voidable. The Workers' 
Compensation Act provides that "the responsibility for compensation 
and payment of medical ... expenses .. shall be on the employer and 
its insurance carrier and not on the employee." U.C.A. § 3 5-1-45. 
Therefore, we find that the stipulation of the parties is not 
enforceable and, therefore, will not bar to the applicant's claim 
for additional benefits. We further find that the applicant is not 
liable for the payment of the medical bills which remain unpaid as 
a result of the mistake contained in the settlement agreement. 
II. WAS THE APPLICANT WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY? 
The ALJ found that the applicant was hired by the respondent 
to work on water well drilling rigs. The applicant believed that 
he was expected to work everyday unless there was no work. On most 
days the respondent drove the applicant to the work site in the 
morning and home at the end of the day. On June 4, 1990, the day 
of the accident, the men were on their way to a job site when the 
respondent stopped to assist his cousin in setting up the cousin's 
rig. The respondent did not expect the applicant to help with this 
work, but he did not specifically tell the applicant not to help. 
The applicant did assist in setting up the rig and got his fingers 
crushed by a pipe around 10:00 a.m.. 
"Each employee ... who is injured...,by accident arising out 
of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, ... shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury.... U.C.A. § 35-1-45 (Supp. 1988). The work 
the applicant performed on the date of his injury was of the same 
type that the applicant normally performed for the respondent 
during the course of his employment. Although the applicant was 
not ordered to help, he was also not told not to help. According 
to Professor Larson, ,f[w]hen any person in some authority directs 
an employee to run some private errand or do some work outside his 
normal duties for the private benefit of the employer or superior, 
an injury in the course of that work is compensable.ff Larson's 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 27.41 (1992) [citations omitted]. 
Further, 
...the employer's 'order' need not take the 
form of an outright command, if in the 
circumstances the employer's 'suggestion' or 
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even the employee's impression of what is 
expected of him in serving the interests of his 
employer or superior, are in fact sufficient to 
motivate his undertaking the service in 
question. 
Id. at § 27.48 (emphasis added). We believe, based upon the 
evidence in the record, that under the circumstances, the applicant 
believed that he was expected to assist in the erection of the 
drilling rig on the date he was injured. The respondent did 
nothing to stop or discourage him from helping. We agree with the 
ALJ that the applicant was within the course of his employment at 
the time of his injury and, therefore, the injury is compensable. 
III. WAS THE EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT'S INABILITY 
TO PAY SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH LIABILITY FOR THE 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND? 
The Uninsured Employers' Fund (Fund) asserts that the evidence 
in the record was insufficient to trigger liability of the Fund. 
Respondent Stoddard testified that he owns his shop building, some 
tools and the lot that his shop sits on free and clear. Stoddard 
did not know what this property was worth. Stoddard also owns a 
1962 International Harvester 10 wheel truck with a drilling rig 
mounted on it and a 1978 1 ton work truck. Stoddard has a Ford 10 
wheeler with a drilling rig, which has an outstanding balance owed. 
Stoddard borrowed $7,000.00 against the Ford to pay the applicant 
pursuant to the prior settlement agreement. Stoddard also 
testified that his net income was $13,000.00 last year. His 
monthly obligations included $800.00 for alimony which is deducted 
from his income for tax purposes, $250.00 for income tax, the 
$3,000.00 balance on the loan to pay the applicant and food and 
utility expenses. 
The only evidence presented to establish the employer's 
insolvency was Stoddard's testimony. The testimony was not 
corroborated by bank statements or tax records, and did not 
establish the value of Stoddard's primary assets, his shop building 
and the land upon which it sits. The statute creating the Fund 
does not address the allocation of the burden of proof of 
establishing an employer's insolvency. 
In the present case, we do not believe that the employer's 
insolvency was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Without 
evidence of the value of the employer's real property or trucks, we 
cannot determine that Stoddard was insolvent or otherwise unable to 
pay the award. 




IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the 
administrative law judge dated March 8, 1993, is affirmed with 
regard to the rulings that the compensation agreement was not 
enforceable and that the applicant's injuries arose out of and in 
the course of his employment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Order of the 
administrative law judge which found that the respondent is 
insolvent is hereby reversed and remanded with instructions that 
the administrative law judge take additional evidence on the value 
of the respondent's assets and issue a supplemental order regarding 
the respondent's solvency and the liability of the Uninsured 
Emp1oyers' Fund. 
DATED this SIX day of (D^jfcJLc* J . 1993. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah has reviewed this matter 
once before. At that time, the Commission held that Gregory Lynn 
Biddle was injured in an accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment with W. Franklin Stoddard. The Commission also 
concluded that a prior settlement agreement between Mr. Biddle and 
Mr. Stoddard did not bar Mr. Biddle from pursuing additional 
workers' compensation benefits. The Commission remanded this 
matter to an Administrative. Law Judge to determine whether Mr. 
Stoddard was insolvent, in which case the Uninsured Employers Fund 
("UEF11 hereafter) would be liable for Mr. Biddle's additional 
benefits. 
Pursuant to the Commission's Order of Remand, the ALJ held an 
additional hearing on the issue of Mr. Stoddard's solvency and 
found Mr. Stoddard to be insolvent. Mr. Stoddard and UEF ("the 
Defendants") then filed their respective Motions For Review, 
thereby bringing this matter before the Commission once again. 
In their Motions For Review, neither Mr. Stoddard nor the UEF 
challenge the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Stoddard is insolvent. 
Instead, they renew the arguments raised in their first set of 
Motions For Review, that Mr. Biddle's injury is not compensable and 
that Mr. Biddle's earlier settlement agreement with Mr. Stoddard 
bars further benefits. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over these Motion For 
Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission affirms and adopts the findings of fact set 
v, forth in the ALJ's decision. 
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DISCUSSION AND ORDER 
As noted above, neither Mr. Stoddard nor the UEF challenge the 
ALJ/s finding on the issue of Mr. Stoddard's solvency. The 
Commission therefore adopts the ALJ's finding that Mr. Stoddard is 
insolvent. 
As to Defendants renewed arguments that Mr. Biddle's injury 
is not compensable and that Mr. Biddle is bound by his prior 
settlement agreement, the Commission has already considered those 
points in its original decision. The Commission hereby reaffirms 
its prior decision for the reasons stated therein. 
In light of the foregoing, the Commission denies Defendants' 
Motions For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this /JjZMay of July, 1994. 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order by filing a Petition For Review with the Court of 
Appeals within 30 days of the date of this Order. 
